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BIOTERRORISM-RELATED ANTHRAX
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The index case of inhalational anthrax in October 2001 was in a man who lived and worked in Florida.
However, during the 3 days before illness onset, the patient had traveled through North Carolina, raising
the possibility that exposure to Bacillus anthracis spores could have occurred there. The rapid response in
North Carolina included surveillance among hospital intensive-care units, microbiology laboratories, medi-
cal examiners, and veterinarians, and site investigations at locations visited by the index patient to identify
the naturally occurring or bioterrorism-related source of his exposure. 
he index case of inhalational anthrax in October 2001 was
in a man who lived and worked in Florida. However, dur-
ing the 3 days before illness onset, he had traveled through
North Carolina, raising the possibility that exposure to Bacil-
lus anthracis spores could have occurred there. On October 4,
concurrent investigations were initiated in Florida and North
Carolina to identify the naturally occurring or bioterrorism-
related source of his exposure. In less than a week, investiga-
tors isolated B. anthracis from the patient’s place of employ-
ment in Florida (1,2). However, the history of travel to North
Carolina had already resulted in a substantial public health
effort in that state. We review the surveillance methods
employed during the rapid response in North Carolina and dis-
cuss several lessons that may prove instructive for future
investigations.
Methods
Surveillance Infrastructure
Retrospective syndrome- and laboratory-based surveil-
lance for illnesses compatible with systemic anthrax infection
was initiated on October 5 and continued for the 27 days from
September 11 to October 6, 2001. Prospective surveillance
was begun on October 7 and suspended on October 12. Based
on the index patient’s travel route, surveillance was undertaken
in all 15 hospitals with intensive-care units (ICUs) in five
North Carolina counties (combined population 1,258,980), and
four regional referral centers in North Carolina (n=2) and
South Carolina (n=2). These 19 hospitals have a total inpatient
capacity of 5,720 beds.
A site coordinator, usually an infection control practitioner
or hospital epidemiologist, was identified to lead the investiga-
tion at each hospital. The site coordinator communicated 1–2
times a day with a public health official designated as county
anthrax surveillance officer. County surveillance officers
reported cumulative data at daily conference calls with the
state anthrax investigation team, which was based at the North
Carolina Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)
in Raleigh. The state medical examiner, state veterinarian, and
other experts (e.g., infectious disease clinicians) also partici-
pated in the daily conference calls to report any unexplained
deaths identified in humans or farm animals and provide con-
sultation as needed. Finally, a statewide information campaign
was initiated by using electronic mailings to North Carolina
health-care professionals and press releases to increase recog-
nition by clinicians, raise public awareness, and provide con-
tact information for any suspected cases. 
Syndrome-Based Surveillance
For the 19 hospitals, investigators identified all patients
admitted to the ICU from September 11 to October 7 who had
blood or cerebrospinal fluid cultures obtained at the initial
encounter. For patients meeting these criteria, the investigation
team reviewed medical records to identify a subset of cases
with one of four primary clinical syndromes, including fever
and 1) severe respiratory disease (i.e., pneumonia or acute res-
piratory distress syndrome), 2) mediastinitis or mediastinal
lymphadenitis, 3) meningitis, or 4) hemorrhagic gastroenteri-
tis. Additional epidemiologic, clinical, and laboratory data
were then obtained to define a specific cause of illness for
patients with any of these syndromes. 
Beginning October 7, hospital site coordinators reviewed
emergency department, ICU, and autopsy logs daily to identify
patients who died or were admitted with any of the four suspi-
cious clinical syndromes. A standard report form was com-
pleted for each suspected case by abstracting the medical chart
and, if needed, interviewing the patient’s physician and family.
Active suspected cases were maintained on a daily line list
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until a specific diagnosis or infectious agent had been identi-
fied or the possibility of anthrax had been excluded. A deci-
sion tree was developed to assist with finding and evaluating
suspected cases (Figure). 
Laboratory-Based Surveillance
Microbiology laboratory records from the 19 hospitals
were reviewed both retrospectively (from September 11  to
October 7) and prospectively (from October 7 to October 12)
to identify suspicious bacterial isolates obtained from nor-
mally sterile sites (e.g., blood, cerebrospinal fluid, or pleural
fluid). A suspicious isolate was defined as 1) nontyped Bacil-
lus  species, 2) unidentified nonhemolytic, nonmotile gram-
positive rod, or 3) any other unidentified isolate that was dis-
carded or sent to a referral laboratory. If the isolate was still
available, additional phenotypic testing was performed at a
local or reference laboratory to rule out B. anthracis. Concur-
rent with that process or if the isolate had been discarded, the
patient’s chart was abstracted to determine if the illness was
compatible with systemic anthrax. 
Site Investigation
Two teams of medical epidemiologists, industrial hygien-
ists, and Federal Bureau of Investigation agents surveyed all
North Carolina locations the patient visited before illness
onset. The environmental investigation focused on two sites,
including a relative’s home and a rural tourist park. Family
members who stayed or traveled with the index patient were
interviewed. Recent illnesses and absences among the 90
employees at the park were reviewed. Available records (e.g.,
annual pass holders, credit card receipts) for approximately
700 persons who visited the park on the same day as the index
patient were held for use in tracking patrons, if needed. Soil,
water, vacuum filters, air filters, and swabs of selected sur-
faces were obtained from both locations to assess for B.
anthracis spores. Samples were divided for testing at the
North Carolina State Laboratory of Public Health and the Cen-
ters for Disease Control and Prevention.
Results
Syndrome-Based Surveillance
Investigators retrospectively identified 361 patients who
were admitted to an ICU from September 11 to October 7 and
had blood or cerebrospinal fluid cultures obtained at the initial
encounter. Of these, 9 (2%) patients had a clinical syndrome of
interest (all fever and severe respiratory disease) and required
additional information to rule out a diagnosis of anthrax. The
identification of suspected cases through retrospective case
finding was completed by the end of the third day of the inves-
tigation. During October 7–12, prospective surveillance identi-
fied an additional five patients with fever and severe
respiratory disease who died or were admitted to an ICU in
one of the 19 hospitals under surveillance (Table). 
Of the 14 cases of interest detected through hospital-based
retrospective or prospective surveillance, 4 (29%) were fatal.
None were due to anthrax. The state medical examiner identi-
fied one additional fatal case that warranted further evaluation
in a county not included in the surveillance. This case of pneu-
monia and sepsis in a 10-year-old boy was subsequently attrib-
uted to a β -hemolytic streptococcus. No suspicious deaths of
animals were reported to the state veterinarian during the rele-
vant time period. 
Laboratory-Based Surveillance
From September 11 to October 12, 10 isolates were identi-
fied through hospital microbiology laboratories that required
additional investigation. All were either Bacillus species that
had not undergone further identification or nonspecific gram-
positive rods that had not been completely evaluated for
hemolysis or motility. None of the patients from whom these
bacteria were isolated had clinical courses consistent with
inhalational anthrax, and none of the organisms were subse-
quently identified as B. anthracis.
Site Investigation
No relevant illnesses were identified in close contacts of
the index patient in North Carolina or in other patrons or
employees of the tourist park. No suspicious events (e.g., aero-
sol releases) or exposures were identified at any of the loca-
tions the patient visited. However, park employees noted that a
cow had died of unknown causes in an adjacent orchard
Figure. Decision analysis developed during the North Carolina investi-
gation for identifying and evaluating patients with possible systemic
anthrax. PCR, polymerase chain reaction.Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 8, No. 10, October 2002 1037
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approximately 1 year earlier. Although the index patient had
not visited this area, he had reportedly drunk water from a
stream that traversed the tourist park after passing through the
orchard. A total of 35 environmental samples were obtained
from sites the index patient visited: 5 (14%) were from the rel-
ative’s home and 30 (86%) from the tourist park, including soil
from the area where the cow died and water from the stream.
Cultures of all environmental specimens were negative for B.
anthracis.
Discussion
In 1999, the North Carolina DHHS established short-term
hospital-based surveillance in 18 counties to assess injuries
and other medical consequences resulting from Hurricane
Floyd. This experience was extremely useful in rapidly imple-
menting syndromic surveillance during the anthrax investiga-
tion. Nevertheless, limited staffing, absence of electronic
surveillance and reporting, the wide geographic area traversed
by the patient, intense media scrutiny, and the simultaneous
involvement of multiple public health and law enforcement
agencies posed major challenges to the investigation.
The North Carolina anthrax investigation team required
contributions from many persons of varied expertise, including
epidemiologists, microbiologists, pathologists, veterinarians,
infectious disease clinicians, infection control practitioners,
engineers, industrial hygienists, health communicators, and
law enforcement and emergency management personnel. The
team operated under a command structure led by the North
Carolina Department of Health and Human Services. Partici-
pating state and federal agencies were represented at both the
investigation headquarters in Raleigh and on each field team.
Conference calls that included all decision-making parties
were held at the same time each day to rapidly disseminate
information throughout team members, and set the specific
priorities of the investigation for the next 24 hours. In addition,
press releases were distributed regularly to minimize reporting
inaccuracies, and dedicated spokespersons were identified to
provide a clear and consistent message.
However, several factors could have helped the investiga-
tion run more efficiently. First, case definitions, surveillance
methods, data collection forms, and informational materials
had to be developed ad hoc throughout the investigation,
resulting in delays in implementing surveillance, uncertainties
as to the effectiveness of and person-hours required by the
case-finding methods, and inefficiencies in the data collection
process. Second, most of the communications and transfer of
information during this investigation occurred by telephone
and fax. Although this system was workable given its rela-
tively small scale, it resulted in inefficient data management
that would have been rapidly overwhelmed by additional cases
or sites. Third, many persons and agencies involved in the
investigation had not previously worked together, resulting in
a lack of familiarity with their respective organization and
capacity. Finally, substantial time and effort were needed dur-
ing the investigation to educate health-care providers and pub-
lic health practitioners about the epidemiology and clinical
manifestations of inhalational anthrax.
This investigation and its ramifications provided an impor-
tant learning opportunity and impetus to better prepare for
future bioterrorist attacks. Standard protocols, data collection
instruments, and informational documents that can be adapted
to specific situations are being developed to minimize delays
and avoid omissions. In North Carolina, resources are also
being used to 1) establish state and regional teams trained in
bioterrorism response and 2) develop a statewide Health Alert
Network. North Carolina’s network will be a secure multidi-
rectional electronic network through which the state health
department can rapidly communicate with hospitals, clini-
cians, and public health and law enforcement authorities. This
new infrastructure will allow for an efficient flow of informa-
tion during future investigations and provide surge capacity to
better respond to requests for assistance at the local level. In
addition, health professionals are being educated statewide to
better recognize the clinical manifestations of biologic agents
that may be used in terrorism. These efforts may build on les-
sons learned from the fall of 2001 to provide a more rapid,
Table. Surveillance methods used to identify potential cases of systemic anthrax or a source of exposure for the Florida index case of inhalational 
anthrax, North Carolina, October 2001
Type of surveillance Targeted population or outcome Locations under surveillance
Intensive-care unit Patients with illness compatible with systemic anthrax infectiona 19 hospitals in North and South Carolinab
Microbiology laboratory Bacterial isolates potentially consistent with Bacillus anthracisc 19 hospitals in North and South Carolina
Medical examiner Unexplained deaths possibly due to anthrax infection Statewide
Veterinarian Unexplained deaths in livestock Statewide
Occupational Unexplained illnesses or absences in employees Tourist park visited by the index patient
Environmental Evidence of B. anthracis spores Residence of index patient’s relative;
tourist park visited by the index patient
aClinical syndromes included fever and 1) severe respiratory disease, 2) mediastinitis or mediastinal lymphadenitis, 3) meningitis, or 4) hemorrhagic gastroenteritis.
bBased on the index patient’s route of travel, surveillance occurred in all 15 hospitals with intensive-care units in five North Carolina counties, as well as four regional referral centers 
in North Carolina (n=2) and South Carolina (n=2).
cA suspicious isolate was defined as 1) nontyped Bacillus species, 2) unidentified nonhemolytic, nonmotile gram-positive rod, or 3) any other unidentified bacteria that was discarded 
or sent to a referral laboratory.BIOTERRORISM-RELATED ANTHRAX
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comprehensive, and efficient response to public health emer-
gencies. 
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